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Field Notes
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has been operational in improvised explosive device (IED) clearance in Hamdaniya, Iraq, since January 2017. Additionally, 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) has operated in the same area 
clearing IEDs since September 2015 and has had operations 
in many parts of both Iraq and Syria. Other nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGO) clearing IEDs include Handicap 
International and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 
(FSD). Without question, IED clearance is now an established 
part of humanitarian mine action (HMA). Yet this does not 
mean HMA should adopt the full spectrum of IED dispos-
al (IEDD) operations. Rather, NGOs can provide invaluable 
capacity only within the appropriate humanitarian context.
IEDs on the Battlefield
IEDs have long been a part of the battlefield mix of explo-
sive hazards, from simple, modified munitions to complex, 
multi-switch devices. In conflicts, these devices are typical-
ly neutralized by specialized military and/or police teams. 
However, not every device is found, so IEDs inevitably end up 
as a part of the explosive contamination left behind after the 
shooting stops. Consequently, HMA actors have a long his-
tory of dealing with booby-trap scenarios involving modified 
munitions, such as in the Balkans, or abandoned IEDs, such 
as in southern Afghanistan. This was generally executed as 
incidental encounters during unexploded ordnance (UXO) or 
mine clearance but not the main effort. However, the battle-
field is evolving, and HMA must grow with it.
The successes of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) and munition stockpile reduction projects have 
limited the availability of these weapons to nonstate actors. 
In the beginning of the insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, IEDs tended to use main charges of unexploded pro-
jectiles or other factory-produced ordnance. When the stock 
of munitions ran out, the bomb makers turned to homemade 
explosive (HME) for main charges. By manufacturing HME 
from common precursors such as aluminum, urea, ammo-
nium nitrate, and potassium chlorate, the bombers created a 
nearly inexhaustible supply chain.
IED Proliferation in Iraq and Syria
IED deployment methodologies changed dramatically 
when ISIS broke out of Syria and swept through a massive 
swath of Iraq in 2014. IEDs became a main strategic tool in 
both offense and defense. Using captured factories and ma-
chinery, ISIS began making improvised landmines, rockets, 
mortars, fuses, and grenades—some of which are complete 
one-off designs—while others are surprisingly decent copies 
of state-produced munitions. The sheer scale and variety of 
IED production and deployment is astounding.
Arguably the most popular design with ISIS is the pressure-
plate IED (PPIED). Although it looks nothing like a mine, it 
is commonly deployed with the same tactical intent as a tra-
ditional mine.
The PPIED consists of two plates held apart by spacers. 
When these plates touch from pressure, the circuit is closed, 
firing an electric detonator. The detonator can be commercial 
or also improvised. Certainly this is a very simple yet effec-
tive device. The main charges are made from just about any 
available container from fuel jugs to tea kettles, or they can 
be made by ISIS from industrial pipes, gas cylinders, or other 
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This kerosene heater was modified into an IED that incorporates both a 
crush necklace and a built-in, anti-lift feature. These devices and others 
like them are sitting among the rubble inside abandoned homes await-
ing returning families.
All photos courtesy of NPA.
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repurposed material. Typical net explosive quantity (NEQ) 
ranges from 6 to 20 kg (13 to 44 lbs), although much larger 
charges have been found when targeting vehicles. Secondary 
anti-lift features are common, as are dual pressure plates. If on 
the surface, even a child’s footstep is enough pressure to func-
tion the device. 
Yet the charges are powerful enough to destroy a truck and 
kill the occupants. PPIEDs currently encountered in Iraq are 
generally robust in design and can remain functional for several 
years. Other improvised mines, which mimic factory-produced 
mines in form as well as function, use mechanical cocked- 
striker fuzing, and these may have even longer operational 
lifespans than electronically-fired systems. ISIS deploys these 
improvised mines in long, patterned rows to defend against 
assault from security forces. Command IEDs can be found in-
terspersed at key points inside the protective row as well.  
An anti-personnel mine, as defined by the APMBC and 
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended 
Protocol II, is “a munition designed to be placed under, on or 
near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by 
the presence, proximity or contact of a person” intended to 
“incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”1,2 The trea-
ty definitions say nothing about the munitions being facto-
ry made, meaning a victim-operated (VOIED) placed on the 
ground or another surface area is an anti-personnel mine un-
der the scope of these definitions, their respective treaties and 
international humanitarian law. 
Another common tactic is to place IEDs inside houses in 
the perimeter of the village and in large defensible structures 
such as schools and hospitals. Some of these IEDs are well dis-
guised as seemingly harmless objects. NPA has encountered 
generators and kerosene heaters repurposed as VOIEDs in 
several houses. The primary switching is small contact beads 
at intervals of fine copper wire, essentially multiple miniature 
pressure plates in a row. The commonly used name for this de-
sign is crush necklace (although many other names are used). 
These crush necklaces can be several meters long and snake 
around doors and stairways. 
The wires are usually enameled or painted to match con-
crete and are hard to see. So far, every device of this category 
that NPA neutralized has also contained at least one second-
ary switch targeting the clearance agent. Crush necklaces are 
also found with other types of main charges. When deployed 
on hard surfaces, the target is personnel, and on soft ground, 
the target is vehicles.
Security forces conducted clearance as they breached 
through, but the quality of the clearance is not to interna-
tional standards and the mapping is nonexistent. The vast 
A typical PPIED with dual pressure plates. The national staff searchers 
have marked it for the IED specialists to prosecute.
The same PPIED after neutralization. Note the square, white electronic 
anti-lift device on the left.
The rubble from an adjacent IED detonation makes the crush necklace 
even harder to see.
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majority of devices remain in situ, especially the massive rows 
of improvised mines. The precise amount of contamination is 
not known, but a reasonable estimate is that over 50 percent 
of communities in the areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq have 
large-scale IED contamination. While the original target was 
security forces, today the victims of these IEDs are the dis-
placed people who are returning home to rebuild their lives. 
Humanitarian Response
The humanitarian crisis created by these IEDs is hard to 
fully comprehend. A massive swath of Iraq and Syria was laid 
waste and booby-trapped. IEDs lurk among the rubble, along 
roads and power lines, inside abandoned houses and govern-
ment buildings, and in agricultural fields.
Some groups within the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
and mine action community have questioned the capability of 
HMA NGOs to clear IEDs. While some of this is an obvious 
ploy to corner the market, the question is nevertheless valid 
and should be discussed openly. Whether NGOs can conduct 
IED clearance effectively has been proven on the ground al-
ready. So perhaps the correct discussion is how and why we 
are operating. The discussion begins by acknowledging two 
crucial differences in NGO capacity versus security forces and 
commercial companies.  
First, HMA NGOs are impartial and not in the fight. 
HMA deployment is non-tactical and engages directly with 
the affected community. The teams are neither intended nor 
equipped to deploy full security cordons or engage defensive-
ly. Deployment is planned in areas far enough away from the 
frontline to reduce the probability of being targeted or being 
caught in an engagement.  
Second, NGOs do not use armor, electronic counter mea-
sures (ECM), fully remote procedures, and security cordons. 
Thus active command or time devices fall outside the scope of 
HMA work. NPA applies a sufficient soak time (period of time 
observed in order to allow active sensors to run down and 
timers to expire) to ensure that any lingering fighters have left 
and that any active timers or power sources have run down. 
The remaining devices are then considered to be abandoned 
IED and fall into the HMA realm. 
But perhaps even more important than how an HMA NGO 
deploys in a C-IED role is why. As defined in International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS), HMA projects “should re-
flect fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, 
impartiality, equality and humanity so that mine action is fo-
cused on giving support to those who are most vulnerable” 
(IMAS 1.10).2 If operators are going to continue to conduct 
HMA, the real question is which C-IED tasks are appropriate 
for a humanitarian operator. If the clearance task involves an 
IED that is at play within the active battlefield, humanitar-
ian intervention is inappropriate because it would raise ques-
tions regarding the humanitarian principles of neutrality and 
impartiality. This is not specific to an IED context but equal-
ly applies to a classic minefield. A humanitarian mine ac-
tion operator would never enter into a conflict zone to clear 
a minefield that one side of the conflict is actively defending 
or maintaining.
Therefore, if there was ongoing IED deployment or over-
watch in an area, it would be inappropriate for a humanitar-
ian operator to intervene as it could, in legal terms, potentially 
constitute direct participation in the conflict.
The HMA Role in IED Clearance
For HMA, the most appropriate environment for opera-
tions is post-conflict or in a theater where active combat is 
not taking place. This allows HMA to focus on giving support 
to those who are most vulnerable and meeting the needs of 
the civilian population and returnees. Thus, HMA focuses on 
three main types of clearance with respect to IEDs: hazardous 
areas, booby-trapped structures, and spot tasks.
Hazardous areas of VOIEDs are improvised minefields, 
and HMA NGOs are the leading actors in mine clearance and 
its associated survey and information management (IM). By 
adapting current best practices in mine clearance, operators 
can efficiently locate and remove the devices and return the 
resource back to the community. Like traditional mine clear-
ance, most of the effort is expended in identifying the areas 
and searching for the devices.
Unlike traditional mine clearance, the improvised nature of 
the threat requires IEDD-qualified staff to deal with even the 
most apparently simple device. NGOs and commercial com-
panies both employ former military personnel to provide this 
capacity. HMA must be vigilant in keeping improvised mine 
clearance procedures distinct from traditional mine clear-
ance. Like all mine or UXO clearance, the skills of the team 
and equipment required must be adjusted to the threat posed 
by the devices.  
Structure clearance is done solely by IED-qualified staff. 
High Risk Search techniques created by military IED opera-
tors are employed, but the tools and methods are compara-
tively low-tech versus proper military teams. Also, given that 
the intent of HMA is to return land and property back to civil-
ian use, protection of property is even more important with-
in the HMA context, so energetic attacks (disruptors, various 
water explosives, shaped charges, etc.) are less commonly 
used. Buildings are selected based on the resource value to the 
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community. For example, NPA has cleared several homes for 
returnees as well as a large primary school and a large second-
ary school in an area 20 km (12 mi) from Mosul.  
For HMA, the results are all about the human impact, not 
just square meters. Spot tasks have changed as well. Before 
the IED proliferation, an unfired round of ammunition was 
simply picked up and hauled off. Now in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Somalia, the same item 
must now be evaluated as a potential come-on or IED com-
ponent. Further, abandoned command or time devices pop up 
as spot tasks here and there. These are essentially then treated 
as VOIED in case of secondary switching (with some excep-
tions such as stuck-fast timer). Of course, drills such as Radio 
Frequency discipline or wire control are still employed—just 
without the worry of an active triggerman or a running timer.
Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses
Security forces, commercial companies, and NGOs each 
have a different role to play in the effort to remove explosive 
hazards. In some cases, NGOs are not suitable at all. In oth-
er cases, NGOs are the best equipped to deliver a solution. In 
fact, NPA proposes that the three sectors of IED response, 
when working together and sharing information, can achieve 
synergy. What is important is to understand our various roles. 
As previously mentioned, NGOs cannot, or at least should 
not, do front-line clearance or active command or time devic-
es. These scenarios are appropriate for security forces and cer-
tain specialized commercial companies.
IED operators take years to develop from scratch, so fast 
response requires a large amount of expat skill sets imported 
to the mission, and commercial companies can more easily 
recruit these operators due to more lucrative compensation. 
NGOs are unlikely to win funding for clearance of private 
commercial property or military bases, whereas commercial 
companies are well suited for these tasks.
Where HMA stands out is in the long grind of survey and 
clearance. HMA developed the land release and toolbox con-
cepts. Land release is a process that coordinates certain types 
of survey with clearance and puts the emphasis on survey over 
clearance in order to get hazard areas released efficiently and 
safely (see IMAS 07.11 for more).  
The toolbox concept is a strategy for utilizing mechanical, 
manual, and animal systems together to optimize quality and 
productivity. Survey of the region and clearance of hazardous 
areas is a slow process even in the best conditions. Time is on 
the side of NGOs. Taking on the large, complex area clearance 
tasks frees up clearance teams from security forces to get back 
in the fight and do what they do best.  
Beyond survey and clearance, HMA activities include risk 
education and community liaison work that have positive in-
direct effects on clearance. NGOs train local teams who, in 
turn, teach local people how to recognize, avoid, and report 
hazards. The obvious benefit is saved lives. But local reporting 
also provides a massive boost in information collection and 
task prioritization. Further, NGOs gain community accep-
tance that can also have security benefits on the ground, par-
ticularly in countries that are suspicious of foreign people and 
organizations.
A row of improvised mines isolated for clearance.
This primary school classroom bears the marking from the HRS clear-
ance process.
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Based on the authors' experience in the commercial and 
HMA sectors, NGOs are far more cost-effective than for-
profit companies. Because NGOs operate at lower costs, and 
because they actively work to build self-sustaining national ca-
pacity, the value per dollar and sustainability are much better. 
However, highly-capitalized commercial companies are more 
agile in initial deployment and redeployment than NGOs. 
Quality management (QM) in HMA and commercial com-
panies is extremely stringent. There are several tiers of internal 
QM, and generally the National Mine Action Authority or the 
United Nations Mine Action Service provides external QM. 
Security forces, on the other hand, do not have the time or re-
sources to devote to clearance at these high standards. 
The final strength of the NGO in this crisis is the value of 
the clearance to the community. NPA’s mandate is to restore 
access, both directly to the people and to aid agencies trying 
to deliver assistance. Other NGOs have similar approaches 
that focus on how the IEDs impact communities in order to 
prioritize assistance with limited resources.
Looking Forward
HMA actors have been clearing improvised devices and 
conducting house clearance of booby traps for years. We 
continue to clear minefields with complex threats including 
anti-lift devices, tripwires, or mixes of UXO, landmines, clus-
ter strikes, and improvised landmines. In each specific task, 
HMA organizations must analyze the threats and adjust their 
training, equipment, and skill set to meet the threat posed by 
the mix of devices in each location. In this sense, dealing with 
IEDs and improvised landmines is nothing new for HMA ac-
tors. What has changed in places like Iraq and Syria is the 
scale of the use of IEDs versus traditional factory-produced 
munitions. Due to the success of the APMBC and government 
efforts to improve physical security and stockpile reduction 
projects, the dwindling supply of anti-personnel landmines 
and professionally-manufactured munitions available to in-
surgent groups appears to be a long-term trend that is here to 
stay. Without the open backing of a foreign government, the 
insurgents’ most likely weapon in the future will continue to 
be improvised devices. 
NPA and other NGOs have clearly demonstrated that 
HMA actors can play a role in IED clearance operations with-
in the appropriate humanitarian context. The question is not 
whether HMA actors can address active command or timed 
devices, but whether it is appropriate given their humanitar-
ian mandate. HMA NGOs can always adjust their capacity to 
respond appropriately to the threat posed by a device. The 
question of where an HMA actor can or cannot operate is not 
determined by the type of device but by the scenario in which 
the device is found in. Once the conflict is over, NGOs can 
move in and devote the months or years needed to return re-
sources back to the communities as part of regaining normal-
cy after war.  
A version of this article first appeared in the Counter-IED 
Report, Autumn 2017.
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Beneficiaries of NGO clearance. These children can now return to school 
after more than two years without formal education.
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Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic 
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military compo-
nents’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or 
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs 
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items 
or components explosive in nature. 
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure 
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty. 
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ ele-
ments of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley,
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C.
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017.
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy. 
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM. 
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn:
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. 
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while ca-
sualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European 
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015):
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11.  Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: Small Arms
Survey, 2017.
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